Why did Israel launch an
invasion of Gaza unlike in all previous times of precipitate and acute
hostilities with Palestinians, Hamas in particular? On the face of it, it can be
easily read that the ground offensive was meant for destroying the tunnels used
by the Hamas who have fired a steady barrage of rockets into Israel. Hamas use
these tunnels to surreptitiously access both Israel and Egypt . But surely, that
is not a worthwhile object as Hamas can rebuild the tunnels. Israel has publicly
stated that the objectives of the invasion do not include ending Hama's rule in
Gaza. Already, Israel has lost more men than they perhaps reckoned with prior to the invasion.
So what was it that prompted them to go
into Hamas territory knowing fully well that such aggression will have only
temporary impact on Hamas? To answer that, one has to understand the nuances of
the security doctrine Israel has been practicing over the years. Ever since its
inception until recently,
conventional Arab militaries, of countries such as Egypt and Syria, were its
greatest threats. Israel fought three wars against its Arab
neighbors in 1948, 1967, and 1973. At that time Israel felt that Arab
states will not accept its existence and so a peace deal is also impossible. That
meant it could only manage the threat and not solve it altogether. It had to
live with a certain level of threat and it evolved a strategy of weakening its enemies
with occasional military forays before they reach proportions of existential challenge. It
wanted just to ameliorate its security problems until a stable political
solution is arrived at, as it was not possible to immediately eliminate the problems. The long confrontation to be punctuated with decisive battle
field victories which could force the Arabs to eventually accept Israel's
permanence and result in final peace
This was the doctrine that shaped its
strategy which it adopted against sovereign nations as well as militant groups
since 1948. The strategy worked well for Israel in buying peace with Egypt and
later Jordan. Now Israelis see themselves as being under siege by Hamas
and like any of those other previous threats, this needs to be managed. You
can't defeat Hamas completely. But Israel at the same time realizes that the threat from
Hamas is not akin to the Cold War era threats it faced against Arab State's
conventional armies. Israel doesn't believe that old strategy will work today
with non-state militant groups like Hamas whom it sees as implacable enemies,
who want to destroy the Jewish state, and finds little leeway to deal with them
politically. So its thinking appears to be in terms of regular military assaults like
the present Gaza invasion designed to cripple the military capabilities of
Hamas, specially its rocket launching ability. By cropping periodically the
Hamas's military capabilities it hopes to lessen their rocket forays, out of
fear of retribution. Israel hopes, like Egypt and Jordan, Hamas also will
eventually give up on the intent to destroy Israel.
So it has
evolved a newer version of its long term strategy of threat management sans
elimination which is euphemistically called "mowing the grass", - a creepy term,
as it implies periodically killing people. But that's the basic analog, Hamas,
like grass, can't disappear, but it can be regularly cut down to size. The Gaza invasion
is about 'mowing the grass'.
However, whether the strategy is working well for
Israel in the present conflict is yet to become clear. Israel has to realize
sooner or later that the world is glaring at it for having only this horrible
concept and the resultant dastardly strategy of " mowing the grass', which at best
is only a holding pattern. It has no political security strategy of
diplomatically resolving the dispute with Palestinians which is essential if it
has to survive beyond the occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza.
The
current Gaza invasion, helps Palestinians to put international pressure on
Israel to concede to them more favorable terms. And Israel must also recognize that
already Hamas has gained in a fashion; it debunked the belief that political
stalemate with the Palestinians is cost-free for Israel. It has raised the
Palestinian profile and also extracted heavy psychological price from Israel.
Empathetic perception of Palestinians as the weak victim confronting a mighty
aggressor could be translated into increased international pressure on Israel
and isolating it politically and damaging it economically.
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